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ABSTRACT The goal of this study is to extend the guarantees provided by the secure transmission
protocols such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security (TLS) and apply them to the
application layer. This paper proposes a comprehensive scheme that allows the unification of multiple
security mechanisms, thereby removing the burden of authentication, mutual authentication, continuous
authentication, and session management from the application development life-cycle. The proposed scheme
will allow creation of high-level security mechanisms such as access control and group authentication on top
of the extended security provisions. This scheme effectively eliminates the need for session cookies, session
tokens and any similar technique currently in use. Hence reducing the attack surface and nullifying a vast
group of attack vectors.
INDEX TERMS Authentication, multi-factor authentication, password-less authentication, application layer
security, session management, cookies, tokens.
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of technology and reliance on it has provided us
with the comfort of on-demand availability of information
systems on portable devices. Banking, healthcare, education
etc. [1], [2], all have seen major improvements in remote
availability. The increased availability and complexity, gives
rise to the risk of an information system being compromised
by malicious agents. Compromised information system can
have severe implications in real world, ranging from iden-
tity theft to nuclear meltdowns [3]. Conventional security
systems based on protocols such as SSL, Transport Layer
Security (TLS) are considered secure. This is valid for data
in motion and does not cater for data in use by the infor-
mation systems. Hence the information system remains vul-
nerable to attacks which are not deterred by the security
guarantees provided by protocols such as SSL and TLS. TLS
does provide provable security during the initial handshake
process which is based on hard problems such as integer
factorization, discrete logarithm problem, or elliptic curve
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Kuan Zhang.
discrete logarithm problem. The underlying hard problem is
dictated by the selected cipher suite. Transportation of the
data on the other hand is usually symmetrically encrypted
which is assumed to be secure [4]. Applications however
rely on application layer sessions that are distinct from the
transport layer sessions. Usually application session manage-
ment mechanisms are developed by application developers
who have limited to nonexistent knowledge of security. This
has led to serious design flaws being present in widely used
applications [5].
Security is considered a nonfunctional requirement and
given low consideration during the software development
life-cycle (SDLC) [6]. Standardization of session mecha-
nisms on the application layer is insufficient, and there is a
lack of readily available frameworks [7]. It is due to these
issues that application development process remains highly
prone to problems like logic errors, improper coding etc. [8].
The diverse nature of systems usually makes it very difficult
to provide a unified security architecture that could be used
not only to secure data in transit but also the data that is
being processed at the application layer. Every application
designer must implement their own security procedures on
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the application layer which is usually prone to catastrophic
failures [7].
An information system’s integrity is dependent upon the
authentication phase. Problems with authentication can either
lead to lack of provisioning or to provisioning of resources
to an adversary. Often systems are compromised due to
problems at the authentication phase [9]. Once a user is
authenticated there is a need to keep the user authenticated
for the duration of interactions with the system without
involving explicit re-authentication. This process is known
as session management [10]. Session management is one
of the most critical areas where the security of a system
can be compromised e.g. web-based systems rely on cookies
and tokens as a primary source of continual authentication.
Mechanisms like cookies and tokens are susceptible to attacks
and are a reason of enlargement of the attack surface. After
the analysis of current network technologies; a lack of stan-
dardization for session management at application level is
evident, whereas, there is extensive standardization at trans-
port level [7]. An abstract discordance between these layers
leads to the application layer being unable to benefit from the
session management at the lower levels. Sessions if extended
to the application layer will not only fetch better security for
the system but also dramatically reduce the amount of effort
that is currently being put into securing systems.
The registration phase in many currently deployed sys-
tems is considered a source of collecting authentication
information.Whereas, this study emphasizes on the extension
of the registration phase to serve as a key exchange or a
key setup phase. Most systems leverage multi-factor
authentication. The same can be used to facilitate key setup
and key revocation. Such a setup will allow mutual authen-
tication as compared to the server authentication in the tra-
ditional scenarios. Trust establishment between parties com-
municating over insecure channels has always proven to be a
challenging problem, this scheme also works in environments
where the traditional trust establishment infrastructure (PKI)
is not suitable. Similarly the proposed scheme can be used to
establish trust in situations where shifting burden of trust to a
third party is not an option [11]. An example scenario is the
use of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) to acquire bogus TLS
certificates [12] and the sale of counterfeit TLS certificates on
the darkweb [13]. The scheme can be implemented in amulti-
party scenario where any number of participants can access
resources in both individually identifiable, and a private mode
where an individual’s identity is concealed by the group. This
paper looks at the feasibility of the proposed system to form
the basis for an access control mechanism.
A. CONTRIBUTIONS
The main contributions are listed as follows:
• This study highlights the lack of a unified security archi-
tecture and discusses the issues that occur because of
the limited cryptographic support TLS provides to the
application layer.
• A novel mechanism is proposed which uses keys as an
alternative to passwords and relies on cryptographically
secure primitives for authentication, mutual authenti-
cation, continuous authentication, session management
and other functionalities that are based on these mecha-
nisms such as access control.
• The paper proposes an alternative methodology to the
traditional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for mutual
authentication in web-based applications.
• A client-server system is implemented that relies on
the proposed scheme. The implementation is tested on
an http server to achieve functionality similar to https
without using PKI, tokens or cookies.
B. ORGANIZATION
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; in section II,
currently used authentication techniques are discussed.
Scheme primitives have been discussed in Section III.
Section IV contains details of the proposed scheme. SectionV
details the implementation setup and results. Section VI con-
cludes with a summary and discusses the future work.
II. AUTHENTICATION TECHNIQUES
The very first and the most important aspect of accessing
a digital device or a service is the identification of a legiti-
mate user authorized to access the digital device or service.
Authentication [14] serves as the very basic countermeasure
that ensures that only authorized users are granted access and
unauthorized users are denied access. Numerous techniques
and methodologies have been developed over the years that
serve the purpose of authentication specifically. Distributed
applications such as web applications are inherently state-
less [15] that require retransmission of authentication data
with every service request. Such a paradigm for continuous
authentication [14] is disruptive for the seamless operation
of a service and therefore requires an automated methodol-
ogy for the retransmission of authentication credentials e.g.
application sessions.
Authentication is one of the major challenges that is
faced by any information system. Without having a foolproof
authentication mechanism an information system is highly
susceptible to a multitude of malicious intrusions. Some
major authentication techniques are discussed below.
A. PASSWORD-BASED AUTHENTICATION
Password-based authentication serves as the primary authen-
tication mechanism. Passwords are easy to deploy but they
can also be termed as an aging authentication technique [16].
Written down passwords pose a significant security risk;
therefore, sufficiently secure and usable passwords must be
memorized. Memorizing random strings of alphanumeric
data with amix of special characters tends to get tedious as the
size of passwords grow. Real world choices of passwords use
a limited character set to keep the passwordsmanageable with
regards to memorability [17]. By doing so one effectively
reduces the total possible combinations available as pass-
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words. Password choices also tend to skew towards the usage
of meaningful words. These factors cumulatively reduce the
entropy of passwords by a very huge factor. These weak
passwords are easily susceptible to guessing, brute force and
dictionary attacks [18].
The skewed nature of passwords has been addressed by
Wang et al. in [19] by using 14 large scale datasets which
includes 113.3 million real world passwords. Their work
highlights the distribution of passwords generated by human
users, along with providing a methodology to ascertain the
security strength of a password dataset. They have used
natural language processing techniques [20] to propose two
models for the distribution of passwords namely ‘‘PDF-Zipf’’
and ‘‘CDF-Zipf’’. The researchers based on their findings
proposed a newmetric for the calculation of effective entropy
of a usable password dataset. The metric depends upon the
size of the dataset used and the number of successful guesses
during an optimal attack [21], [22]. Their system was trained
on English datasets, e.g. ‘‘Flirtlife.de’’ and ‘‘Rockyou’’ pass-
word datasets, however with the increasing support for Uni-
code [23] in online services the prevalence of passwords
generated in other languages has increased. Our search for the
word ‘‘ ’’ in both ‘‘Flirtlife.de’’ and ‘‘Rockyou’’ returned
empty. These findings suggest that their proposed models
may not be generalizable to support all languages.
B. KEY-BASED AUTHENTICATION
Key-based authentication techniques [24], [25] belong to the
category of authentication techniques based on something
you have. Unlike passwords that require the authenticatee (an
entity that is to be authenticated) to transmit the authenti-
cation data, key-based authentication schemes allow authen-
tication based on the solution to a complex mathematical
problem [26]. Such schemes allow the exchange of authenti-
cation information without transmitting the keys that are used
as a replacement for passwords. It therefore provides higher
security by not allowing the authentication information to
be eavesdropped. Storing public keys on the server side in
databases also has the added advantage of being immune to
theft in case of server side breaches and database enumeration
attacks [27], [28].
In [29] a novel authentication scheme has been devised
using asymmetric cryptography based on generalized discrete
logarithm problem and integer factorization problem. They
have demonstrated their scheme to be highly efficient as it
performs significantly better than self-certified schemes [30].
Key-based authentication schemes are usually computation-
ally intensive because of the use of public key cryptography
and therefore pose a challenge for low performance devices
such as the ones used in IoT. Sciancalepore et al. present a
novel scheme that allows low performance IoT devices to
successfully achieve agreement with reduce overheads [31].
C. MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION
The issues faced while using traditional authentication mech-
anisms and the fact that authentication can be achieved based
on something you know, something you are and something
you have has led to the development of the multi-factor
authentication paradigm [32]. Multi-factor schemes tend to
incorporate two or more than two authentication factors.
Alizai et al. [26] proposed a secure multi-factor device
authentication scheme which uses digital signatures and
device’s capability to perform secure authentication. The
multi-factor approach presented in their scheme uses device
capability as a novel basis thereby protecting against attacks
like man-in-the-middle and replay attacks.
Multi-factor authentication provides a higher security as
compared to traditional authentication mechanisms [33].
However, the inclusion of a multi-factor authentication mech-
anism also increases the attack surface and introduces new
attack vectors.Multi-factor authentication that relies on out of
band communication channels can be exploited based on the
vulnerabilities of the side channel [34]. For example, spoof-
ing of authentication SMS and calls using a software-defined
base station with a higher signal strength. These attack vec-
tors can prove devastating for systems that put undue trust
in the side channels integrity. Base station spoofing and a
plethora of other vulnerabilities in the GSM network have
been highlighted in the study [35].
D. BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION
Everyone has ‘‘one of a kind’’ attributes, some of which
can be utilized to remarkably distinguish individuals. These
qualities are extensively partitioned into physiological and
behavioral biometrics. These biometric attributes incorporate
iris, retina, fingerprint, palmprint, footprint, DNA, facial,
voice, signatures or keyst-roke recognition respectively.
Rathod et al. [36] have conducted a comprehensive study
on the fingerprint biometric recognition systems. The study
covers in detail false acceptance rate and false rejection rate.
The paper also discusses limitations of each scheme that they
analyze.
Multiple biometric [37] features instead of single biomet-
ric feature can also be used to authenticate a person more
effectively and securely. In scenarios where multiple biomet-
ric features are used to authenticate a person, an attacker
will have to create and misrepresent all the diverse sorts of
biometric information. For example, acquiring a fingerprint
and an iris image of adequate quality will be a difficult
task for the attacker, thereby, making the attack difficult.
Multi-biometrics framework is presented in [37] where differ-
ent issues and tradeoffs are discussed in detail when designing
such a multi-biometric framework.
E. HARDWARE AUTHENTICATION
Another perspective that can exceptionally authenticate an
entity is the ownership of something. Things like smart-
cards [38], USB Security keys [39], RFID labels [40] can be
utilized for authentication. Some of which may even utilize
physical device attributes, for example, Physically Unclon-
able Functions (PUFs) [41]. PUFs are based on the distinctive
properties of the equipment. These properties are incredibly
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hard to duplicate as they are based on a substantial number of
factors including environmental noise and inherent material
characteristics.
A lot has been done in the wake of standardizing the
hardware-based authentication however it remains an area
of active research. Some standard hardware-based secu-
rity implementations include Hardware Security Modules
(HSMs) [42]. HSMs are based on the idea of having a separate
cryptographic co-processor which can provide cryptographic
capabilities to other devices as an attached peripheral or over
a network. HSMs do come with a hefty purchase price.
Manufacturers of newer high end computational devices have
started incorporating Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) [43]
into their devices. TPMs resemble HSMs a lot in their func-
tionality however they have a one to one relation with the
device in which they are built in at the time of manufacture.
Once a TPM is compromised it is not feasible to just replace
the hardware and revocation of the keys also presents a major
challenge [44].
III. SCHEME PRIMITIVES
This section highlights the scheme primitives that are helpful
for understanding the scheme presented in the next section.
This section also discusses the advancements in relative
literature.
A. SESSION MANAGEMENT
After every successful authentication, there is usually
a requirement for a procedure that allows subsequent
requests to be authenticated without having to repeat the
authentication phase. Session management techniques allow
state-fullness and authentication without the overhead of
re-authenticating. HTTP being stateless, achieves this stateful
behavior by using cookies and tokens [45]. TLS achieves
session management using IDs being sent as a part of the
server ‘‘hello’’ message [4]. A technique for secure ses-
sion management based on shared secret has been proposed
in [10], which uses a simple incremental counter and HMAC
for sessionmanagement [46] but it has some performance and
networking overhead.
Session management has been standardized for use in
transport layer protocols like TLS, however the same cannot
be said for application layer. Session management security
issues have been ranked second in the Open Web Applica-
tion Security Project (OWASP) top ten application security
problems [9]. Session management mechanisms at the trans-
port level do not provide enough session information to the
application layer and stateless applications have intermittent
transport layer sessions that span over single request response
pair [15]. Every new request initiates a new session that is
not related to the previous request. Most applications create
their own independent session management. A partial goal of
this study is to propagate the sessions established at transport
layer to the application layer. Thereby effectively merging
independent sessions at different layers of the network stack
and providing a strong cryptographic basis for the resulting
sessions. Ultimately leading to a strong standardization of
the session management process and effectively reducing the
application development effort that must be put into custom
built session management.
B. COOKIES AND TOKENS
Cookies and tokens are the most widely employed continual
authentication mechanisms used over the world wide web.
HTTP and HTTPS both rely on cookies to provide stateful
sessions. A forged cookie will result in the compromise of
a system that has built its trust based on cookie’s integrity.
A wide array of techniques are available to the attacker for
faking an application session that mainly include but not
limited to session fixation [47], cookie theft [48] and token
forgery [47]. A stolen cookie [49] can be used to set up
a malicious session, although the attacker does not possess
any information about the authentication information. The
duration for which a session remains active needs to be
optimized. Shorter durations tend to become a hurdle in the
smooth working of the system. Similarly longer durations
are severely vulnerable as they provide ample time for the
attacker to conduct its malicious activity.
Stateless environments put the burden of implementing
propermechanisms on the system developers [47]. A stateless
solution to the issues faced with cookies is tokens. Tokens
are much like cookies however they are not persistent and do
not require local storage. Tokens are built into the application
logic e.g. secret strings appended to the URL or post data
embedded into web pages. Just like cookies they are required
to be transmitted along with every request however the token
secret needs randomization after a few uses or else it can
result in session fixation attacks [50]. Random number gener-
ation on such amassive scale, which can be used to effectively
generate a token with enough entropy is usually a compu-
tationally costly operation. Invalidating a token requires a
massive blacklist to be kept. This blacklist must be searched
and accessed for every request being processed.
A comprehensive study was conducted on the viability and
privacy concerns regarding cookies used by the top 100K
Alexa websites [51]. Their analysis shows a very high preva-
lence of extremely insecure cookies. Zheng et al. [52] found
cookie related vulnerabilities to be present in important sites
including Google and Bank of America. They further ana-
lyzed the adverse effects on these vulnerabilities due to weak
implementations in browsers that are widely being used.
C. TRANSPORT LAYER SECURITY MECHANISMS
Security of the data in motion is of major importance for
any information system. One of the most used protocols
for the security of data in motion is TLS. Besides security,
the protocol is used to prevent eavesdropping, tampering and
message forgery. Different cipher suites [4] can be used with
TLS. Each cipher suite has its own underlying cryptographic
primitives thereby provisioning different aspects and levels
of security. TLS incorporates a variety of key agreement
methodologies as well.
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FIGURE 1. Proposed scheme.
TLS mainly focuses on the establishment of a secure com-
munication channel [4]. Another study proposes an approach
that is based on public key authentication for clients over
networks such as the internet. They propose a TLS exten-
sion called TLS Origin Bound Certificates (TLS-OBC). This
TLS extension allows clients of a system to establish strong
authenticated channels with their servers. They use the tech-
nique to bind existing authentication tokens such as HTTP
cookies to the authenticated channels. This scheme achieves
a higher security for authentication using OBC. The scheme
is typically feasible for existing world wide web infrastruc-
ture [53]. It is usually difficult to segregate TLS traffic based
on the service it belongs to. Kim et al. [54] have proposed
a novel approach to generate service signatures from the
payload data of the TLS packets automatically. Their scheme
achieves 90% efficiency of classifying TLS traffic according
to the application/services they belong to.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
In the proposed scheme authentication, continuous authen-
tication and session management are achieved at applica-
tion layer by exploiting the fact that every service that
requires user authentication has an associated registration
phase. Figure 1 illustrates the public key exchange being
carried out via side channels typically used for multi-factor
authentication such as email etc. Once the key exchange has
been carried out, a secure session can be established without
using cookies or tokens at any time by following the steps
shown in the figure 1. These steps ensure secrecy, aliveness,
synchronization and immunity to Man-in-the-Middle attack.
The steps are discussed in detail in the following sections.
Table 1 explains the symbols used in the proposed scheme.
A. REGISTRATION PHASE
The registration phase has traditionally been used only as an
account setup prerequisite, however in the proposed scheme,
TABLE 1. Table of notations.
FIGURE 2. Sample certificate.
the registration phase is used not only in the traditional sense
but also for the mutual authentication of both the service
provider (Server) and the service requisitioner (Client). Most
registration processes use side channel multi-factors such as
email etc. This serves as the baseline for associating the pub-
lic key to the digital identity presented at registration phase
as illustrated in figure 2. Therefore, mutual authentication is
very simple to establish given both the client and the server
exchange their public keys during the registration phase.
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The client sends its public key to the service provider
along with other registration information. This key does not
require a certification authority to verify and sign it. The
server will verify its ownership during the verification step
using the multi-factor side channel e.g. an email containing
verification information. Similarly, the server will send its
own public key to the client via the same multi-factor side
channel. The server’s public key may or may not be certified
by the certification authority, a better practice would be to
have it certified.
B. AUTHENTICATION PHASE
Once both the server and the client have access to each other’s
public key information, it is possible for both server and client
to mutually authenticate each other. Whenever the claimant
sends a request to the server containing its identification
information (ID tag), the server initiates a challenge-response
scheme to authenticate the claimant. First, the server sends
a random number R.S, server’s identity S and a timestamp
encrypted with the public key of the client as a challenge.
The client decrypts the challenge and generates its random
number R.C. Then client concatenates its random number
R.C and client’s identity C with the decrypted challenge,
computes its hash and sends the hash alongwith the encrypted
client’s random number R.C with the public key of the
server. Upon receiving the challenge, the server decrypts the
received random number R.C, identity C, concatenates it with
previously sent challenge and recomputes the hash of this
newly created string. If the computed hash and the received
hash are both equal at the server’s side, this guarantees client
authentication at server’s side.
C. SESSION KEY ESTABLISHMENT
Now that both parties have each other’s random number, sym-
metric keys are established based on the exchanged random
numbers. They can easily create a symmetric session key
which can be used in future requests without re-initiating
the above challenge-response scheme again. To get a session
key, both parties simply concatenate the random numbers and
take hash of it using SHA 256. The resultant hash will be
associated to the ID tag of the client on server side. The same
hash will work as an AES 256-bit symmetric session key that
will be used until the session expires. Once the symmetric
session has been established, both client and server verify
each incoming message by making sure that it has been
encrypted using the same key that they computed during the
key exchange. A message authentication code (MAC) [55]
and client’s ID tag is appended to every message that is
transferred thereby enabling source authentication.
D. SCHEME HANDSHAKE
As illustrated in the figure 3, after sending an authentica-
tion request in step 1, the client must decrypt the challenge
presented in step 2 to be capable of successfully completing
the protocol negotiation. The same challenge also serves as a
proof of client’s identity. The data decrypted during step 3 is
FIGURE 3. Scheme handshake.
directly involved in the creation of the symmetric session key.
Therefore, knowledge of the session key implies the knowl-
edge of correct decryption in step 2 and hence proves the
identity of the client. At server’s side, a similar chain of events
leads to the authentication of the server. As evident from
the step 4 server is presented with an encrypted challenge,
the correct decryption of which allows the server to obtain
the information necessary for the creation of the session key.
The knowledge of the correct symmetric session key serves
as the proof of the server’s identity. Hence both the client and
the server are mutually authenticated.
E. SECURITY PROVISIONS
Authentication and continuous authentication are achieved
by verifying each message. Session management in complex
environments such as the world wide web depend heavily on
stored artifacts such as the cookies and tokens. Verification
success for a message implies that the message belongs to the
session in question. Hence the need for cookies and tokens
is eliminated. Higher level access control can be tied to the
sessions to provision resources.
The proposed scheme mitigates cookie theft and token
forgery attacks by eliminating the use of passwords, cook-
ies or tokens for authentication, session management. The
proposed scheme relies heavily on asymmetric key cryptog-
raphy for authentication as well as session management.
a: DISCUSSION
Following list enumerates the functionalities achieved
through the scheme.
• This scheme provides mutual authentication between
two or more parties.
• The scheme provides mutual authentication using a cer-
tificate exchange at registration phase.
• Sessions are created based on user authentication.
• Critical session information and cryptographic keys are
derived for each session.
• The scheme provides continuous authentication based
on the derived session key.
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FIGURE 4. Scyther script - 1.
FIGURE 5. Scyther script - 2.
• All communication is symmetrically encrypted using
TLS-PSK like cipher suites and integrity checks (MAC)
are applied thus eliminating the need for cookies and
tokens.
• Cipher suites that do not guarantee immunity to replay
attacks requires an additional nonce encrypted with the
same key, to be sent along with the encrypted data. This
nonce is to be retained by the recipient during the active
session.
• Ultimately resulting in secure sessions that are not vul-
nerable to attacks like cookie theft and token forgery.
• A session key remains usable for fix period thereby
enforcing session timeouts.
• Session identifiers are mapped on to access control
mechanisms which are in turn based on authentication
information negotiated at registration phase.
• Keys derived from the authentication information
and session information can be used to secure the
communication.
V. SECURITY GOALS AND ANALYSIS
The proposed system has been analyzed usingmultiple analy-
sis techniques. These techniques include simulating an adver-
sary model using Scyther [56] based automated protocol
verification tool and simulation of attacks such as man-in-
the-middle attack leading to eavesdropping, packetmirroring,
and replay of communication data. Communications were
also analyzed for basic security provisions and the security
goals were studied using Wireshark. This section briefly
discusses the results extracted from the analysis.
A. SCYTHER-BASED ANALYSIS
The proposed scheme is analyzed with Scyther, which is an
automated tool for protocol verification. Scyther script is used
to test and validate the secrecy, aliveness, synchronization and
resistance to man-in-the-middle properties of the proposed
scheme. Scyther has its own scripting syntax which allows
the simulation of protocols and their intruder models.
Scyther uses the keyword ‘‘fresh’’ when declaring a new
variable. Figure 4 shows the nonce and timestamp creation.
Keyword ‘‘var’’ is used when creating a new variable to
store ‘‘fresh’’ type values that are received by another role.
Figure 5 shows how new ‘‘var’’ type variables are created in
Scyther.
FIGURE 6. Scyther script - 3.
FIGURE 7. Scyther script - 4.
The function send_1 and recv_1 simulate message trans-
mission between the communicating agents. For every send
function call in the sender agent there must be corresponding
receive call in the receiving agent. Each of these calls are
post-fixed with the same number indicating corresponding
communication. Figure 6 shows a signed message being sent
by the sender to the receiver.
Figure 7 shows a symmetrically encrypted message being
sent by the sender to the receiver. The message is encrypted
using the message digest of a string that corresponds to the
key string that was generated during protocol handshake in
our case.
ANetwork ThreatModel [57] was simulated using Scyther
script to analyze the security of the proposed scheme. The
simulation was carried out under the following assumptions.
• The intruder is partially or fully in control of the
network.
• The intruder can deflect, create and learn messages
and is very powerful as defined by Dolev-Yao intruder
model [57].
1) SECURITY VALIDATION
The verification of the scheme is given below according to
the attributes of Scyther’s tool.
a: SECRECY
The first claim is that the scheme guarantees that users
credentials will remain confidential. After analyzing the
scheme, the credentials of both communicating parties are
not revealed to any adversary when communicating over an
untrusted network. The claims made for secrecy are shown
in figure 8 as claim agent 5,6,7,8 and 9. Random numbers of
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FIGURE 8. Scyther claim script.
FIGURE 9. Scyther result.
both server and client as well as the timestamp used in the
negotiation remained secret as evident from figure 9.
b: ALIVENESS
The second claim is that the proposed technique achieves the
aliveness property. This property ensures that the responding
agent has executed an event in response to the communicating
agent. It also ensures that the message exchange between the
communicating parties has not been tampered, the messages
are digitally signed and correctly time stamped. The claim
made for aliveness is shown using the claim agent 1 in
figure 8. The figure 9 depicts that the client and the server
side achieve the aliveness property.
c: MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE
Intercepting the communication during the handshake phase
will require solving computational complex problems such
as integer factorization, discrete logarithm problem or elliptic
curve discrete logarithm problem. Similarly, the application
data that is symmetrically encrypted will require brute force
attacks. As no plain text data is available for the attacker to
exploit so no attack tree was generated during any of the tests
that were conducted in this research. Hence, it can be claimed
that the proposed scheme is also resistant to man-in-the-
middle attack. The claim for man-in-the-middle resistance is
made using the claim agent 2 as shown in figure 8. Immunity
against man-in-the-middle is achieved at both client and
server side as evident from figure 9.
d: SYNCHRONIZATION
As described in man-in-the-middle section, an attacker will
have no control over the system thereby limiting their capabil-
ity for a replay attack. Mirrored/copied data might be resent
to the recipient however the inclusion of nonce in sent data
nullifies its effect. Hence the fourth claim that the proposed
scheme is resistant against replay attacks is proved as it
does not satisfy Non-injective Synchronization (Nisynch)
property [58]. Nisynch property is used to ensure that the
communication between sender and receiver is synced and
sent by the sender. The claim made for synchronization is
shown using claim agent 3 as shown in figure 8. The syn-
chronization property has been achieved as evident from the
results portrayed in figure 9.
2) SCYTHER RESULTS
The Scyther script validated both communicating parties
namely the server and the client separately. The figure 9
shows the results generated by Scyther. Scyther verified and
validated the secrecy, aliveness, synchronization and resis-
tance to man in the middle properties for the considered
communicating parties.
Results of the Scyther analysis verify that ServerRandom,
ServerData which were initialized as Nonce variables and
ServerTimestampwhich was initialized as a timestamp on the
server’s side remained secret. Similarly, the confidentiality
of ClientRandom and ClientData, which were initialized as
Nonce variables in the client role, is also verified.
B. WIRESHARK-BASED ANALYSIS
The proposed scheme has been tested separately in two envi-
ronments. Firstly, a simple client server environment was
setup. The keys for both client and server were exchanged
over https using a simple registration form. Keys can also
be exchanged manually by placing minimal certificates
(containing only the corresponding public keys). An echo
server was used to emulate the server side. The client-side
application initiated a service request that was reciprocated by
the server with an appropriate authentication challenge. Upon
successful completion of the handshake stage both client and
server agreed to a symmetric key.
The symmetric key was then used to instantiate a cipher
object corresponding to AES-CBC [59] and AES-GCM [60]
during different trials. Both client and server side were able
to authenticate and keep the session running based on MAC
verification (corresponding to the ID tag) i.e. a valid MAC
VOLUME 7, 2019 128551
Z. A. Alizai et al.: Key-Based Cookie-Less Session Management Framework for Application Layer Security
FIGURE 10. Traffic capture - Wireshark.
implies authenticity of the message origin. A simple access
control was emulated using the session information. The
communication was monitored using Wireshark (figure 10)
during testing and the encryption was found to be comparable
to that of TLS using AES-CBC or AES-GCM modes.
The same was tested using simple PHP server-side scripts
and JavaScript running on client’s browser. The results were
very similar to the client server environment. Both the envi-
ronments resulted in successful initialization of the symmet-
ric key and encrypted communication. Additional testing for
the http traffic was conducted using Burp Suite, however it
was unable to produce any reconstruction of the data that was
sent in the PHP setup except for the HTTP encapsulation of
the HTML data that remained unencrypted as intended.
C. RESULT’S EXAMINATION
The testing conducted using Scyther and the imple-
mentation has shown positive results. All the presented
functionality is successfully achieved. Certificates exchanged
during registration are used to mutually authenticate
both the communicating parties thus resulting in strong
authentication. Authentication provides the baseline for the
generation of session keys which are generated in the form
of the shared secret. The shared secret can be used across
multiple requests thus providing consistent sessions and
continuous authentication. Forward secrecy is achieved by
renegotiating the protocol for the generation of a new shared
secret. As access control mechanisms are based on session
information; this results in secure service provisioning.
The proposed system successfully allowed establishment
of a secure communication channel between client and
server. Mutual authentication was achieved in the absence
of any of the traditional security mechanisms such as TLS.
The initial key exchange was carried out using a secure TLS
channel, however it is to be noted that the key exchange
can leverage any of the channels commonly used by two
factor authentications e.g. the server may issue keys to
client via the usual out of band email or SMS channels.
Successful session creation with valid reauthentication was
established. Cookies and tokens were eliminated from the
process. A basic access control criterion was found easy
to implement using the session information that was setup.
Environments lacking traditional security mechanisms can
benefit from the scheme as it can be overlaid over existing
systems.
VI. CONCLUSION
Authentication and session management are both pivotal to
efficiently and effectively secure an information system. The
security guarantees provided at lower layers of the network
stack such as the transport layer provides a standardize and
well tested basis for the issues faced by application layer
session management implementations.
This paper presents an efficient and secure mutual authen-
tication scheme that extends the registration phase’s func-
tionality to include the transfer of mutually authenticating
information i.e. the public keys of both client and server. The
scheme achieves authentication with a limited number of
network transactions. A successful authentication results in
the establishment of a shared secret that can be used in
conjunction with a multitude of cipher suites. The scheme
relies on identification data andmessage authentication codes
appended to every subsequent message/request in-order to
determine its authenticity.
The proposed scheme eliminates the attack vectors asso-
ciated with cookies and tokens by entirely eliminating the
need to use them as authentication information carriers. The
proposed scheme, due to its lack of reliance in the PKI can
prove to be very effective in scenarios that restricts PKI
access.
The future work includes the study of hardware tokens as
a source for authentication information. An extension of the
current scheme using PGP and Blockchain for the initial key
exchange is also underway.
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